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This paper focuses on one of the outcomes arising from England’s choice based education system; the 
extent to which different types of pupils are sorted across schools. Pupil sorting will in turn impact on 
attainment outcomes, if there are peer group effects operating within schools. We consider three 
dimensions across which sorting may occur: ethnicity, income, and, for the first time using UK data, 
ability. We use a very large administrative dataset which contains linked histories of test scores for 
every pupil in England, as well as pupil level markers for ethnicity and low household income, and 
their home postcode (zip code). We first establish that choice is both feasible for and exercised by the 
majority of pupils in England. We then characterise and describe ability sorting and related it to 
feasibility of choice. We compare sorting across schools with sorting across neighbourhoods. We 
establish that post-residential school choice is an important component of the overall schooling 
decision. We show that there is a difference in the school-neighbourhood sorting relationship between 
areas that operate under different student-to-school assignment rules.  
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The analysis of choice in education markets is currently enjoying a boom. In 
the US context, choice primarily means the use of voucher schemes. In the UK it 
refers to the operation of the quasi-market in education. There have been two main 
components in the debate: the impact of choice on improving outcomes through 
competitive pressure on all schools, and the impact of choice on the sorting or 
segregation of pupils across schools. This second issue is the focus of this paper. If 
there are important peer effects in schools, then sorting will influence both the 
efficiency and distribution of education outcomes. This issue is very complex, and has 
been mostly tackled to date using simulated theoretical models
1. Hoxby (2003, p. 6) 
notes that the “most complicated effects of school choice are on student sorting – how 
students will allocate themselves among schools when allowed to choose schools 
more freely”.  
This paper provides some empirical evidence to complement the theoretical 
modelling. Using a universe dataset on all secondary school
2 pupils in England, 
including full test score histories, we characterise ability sorting in England. The 
dataset also includes geocodes for both schools and the pupils, so we can consider 
both school and neighbourhood sorting. There is clearly much we can do with this 
dataset, and this paper reports the first results from our research programme. We 
focus here on the role of the school assignment rule, and the degree of choice of 
schools available.  Two assignment rules are used in different jurisdictions in 
England: neighbourhood schooling and elite schooling. In the former, the chief de 
jure criterion is distance from the school – pupils’ default school is their nearest one. 
                                                 
1 A discussion of this and existing empirical evidence is below. 
2 Secondary schools cover ages 11-16 or 11-18. Details on the data are below. 3 
This is despite the Education Reform Act of 1988 introducing a limited concept of 
choice. In the latter elite or selective areas, pupils are selected into grammar schools 
on the basis of ability.  
We first establish that choice is feasible for most pupils in England, and that it 
is exercised. That is, about half of all pupils in neighbourhood schooling jurisdictions 
do not in fact attend their nearest school. Second, we characterise the nature of ability 
sorting. We do this non-parametrically to exploit the richness and universality of our 
data, as well as calculating the usual segregation indices. We show that ability sorting 
in schools is, unsurprisingly, much greater in elite schooling jurisdictions. 
Conditioning on neighbourhood sorting, we show that post-residential sorting is 
positively correlated with the degree of choice available.  Whilst this is contrary to the 
findings of Epple and Romano (2003), the nature of the English education market is 
sufficiently different from the one they studied to make a direct comparison 
misleading. Finally, we show that the school assignment rule influences 
neighbourhood ability sorting. Assigning pupils to schools on the basis of ability, 
rather than location, breaks the link between school and home, and allows different 
patterns of residential sorting.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 relates our analysis to 
the relevant literature, and Section 3 briefly discusses the structure of, and incentives 
created by, the English education market. Section 4 details our dataset and Section 5 
presents our results. Section 6 provides a brief conclusion. 
 
 
2 Modelling Choice 
 
The economics literature on choice in education covers a broad range of 
methodologies, ranging from largely descriptive empirical work through theoretical 4 
analysis and computable general equilibrium models. The collection edited by Hoxby 
(2003a) provides an excellent selection and overview of this research.  
One of the central questions in this field is the impact of “choice” on 
educational outcomes, principally test scores. Choice, at least in the US context, often 
means the role of educational vouchers to allow particular groups to attend different 
schools. Petersen, Howell, Wolf and Campbell (2003) provide evidence on this 
question using data from experiments with randomised assignment of vouchers, and 
an overview is provided in Hoxby (2003c). Other surveys are in Ladd (2002), and 
Neal (2002). For the UK, Bradley, Crouchley, Millington and Taylor (2000) and 
Bradley and Taylor (2002) use cross-sectional variation in the extent of school choice 
to explore the role of the quasi-market in education operating since the reforms of 
1988. As Hoxby (2003b) makes clear, there are two main forces operating to 
determine the outcome of increased choice. These are the competitive force working 
to increase effectiveness and productivity in schools, and the action of peer effects 
alongside differences in the allocation of students to schools. It is this latter issue that 
we focus on in this paper. 
Hoxby (2003b) argues that comprehensive answers to the complex problem of 
choice and sorting require computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, estimates 
of structural parameters of demand and production functions, and a detailed 
characterisation of student sorting (pp. 6, 7). We aim to provide the last of these in 
this paper, using data for school students in England. Nechyba has a set of papers 
using simulated general equilibrium models of the choice process (for example, 
Nechyba, 1999, 2003a, 2003b) and also a summary of the work on income and ability 
sorting in Nechyba (2004). In the last of these, he discusses three different channels of 
sorting – decentralised sorting based on choice of residence, sorting out of the state 5 
system altogether into private schools, and centralised sorting (tracking) within the 
public school system. Much of the work focuses on the first two of these. A number 
of results come out of this work, perhaps the most important being the relationship 
between school finance, the degree and nature of choice, and spatial residential 
segregation by income and ability. For example, in Nechyba (2003b), it is established 
that a pure public schooling system leads to more spatial segregation than a private 
system. In Nechyba (2003a) the role of private schools is examined further through 
simulations of different voucher systems within the model. In the presence of private 
schools, “residential segregation patterns within heterogeneous public school systems 
are then predicted to be quite different from school segregation patterns, with private 
school markets fostering reduced residential segregation by income and peer quality 
but increased  school segregation along these same dimensions” (Nechyba, 2004, p. 
24 [italics in original]). The relationship between vouchers and sorting depends on the 
voucher system design. Universal vouchers have an ambiguous relationship 
depending on the value of the voucher; targeted vouchers can decrease sorting. 
Similarly, Epple and co-authors have a set of papers looking at Tiebout sorting, 
formation of jurisdictions and sorting. Epple and Romano (2003) model three 
different student assignment regimes: neighbourhood schooling (a strict residence 
requirement for admission), school choice with no choice costs, and multi-
jurisdictions Tiebout sorting. They show that different public policy regimes have 
dramatic impacts on the nature of sorting. Neighbourhood schooling leads to strong 
income stratification across neighbourhoods, with differences in school quality arising 
from peer group differences. Costless, frictionless choice equalises peer groups across 
schools. Epple and Romano argue that it is the residence requirement that is 6 
fundamental to sorting rather than the single or multi-jurisdictions. Again, the 
differential sorting between schools and neighbourhoods is apparent. 
Evidence from the US on sorting typically uses school- and district-level data. 
One important issue is that in the US, any dimension of school segregation is closely 
tied up with racial/ethnic segregation, and the pure effects of choice on sorting are 
difficult to disentangle. Clotfelter (1998) argues that (district) choice influences 
sorting, but Hoxby (2000) disagrees. Her focus is chiefly on controlling for the 
potentially confounding effect of sorting when trying to isolate the competitive effect 
of the degree of choice on productivity. She shows that the effect of the degree of 
choice on outcomes is largely unaffected by the inclusion or exclusion of measures of 
student heterogeneity across districts. On the other hand, the more schools that there 
are in a metro area, the greater the ethnic segregation. She concludes that student 
sorting is more relevant across schools within districts than across districts.  
Close in spirit to the present paper is the work of Söderström and Uusitalo 
(2004), using student level data from Sweden. They compare student sorting along a 
number of dimensions before and after a significant reform to the school admission 
process in Stockholm. This reform switched from a predominantly residence-based 
admissions system to an explicitly ability-based system. Comparison of Stockholm 
and a neighbouring area without the reform enables them to run a difference-in-
difference analysis on the impact of the reform on sorting. They find a significant 
increase in ability sorting in schools, but no change in residential sorting. They find 
the same result for ethnic and income sorting.  
Thus while it is clear that the availability of choice and the degree of sorting 
are potentially important factors in school markets, there is not a great deal of 
evidence to complement the theoretical and CGE modelling.  7 
 
 
3 The Secondary School System in England 
 
The Education Reform Act of 1988 introduced a ‘quasi-market’ in education 
(Glennerster 1991). This system replaced the previous assignment of children to 
schools primarily on the basis of residence and the allocation of central government 
funding to schools by the local jurisdiction, local education authorities (LEAs)
3. The 
‘quasi-market’ had the following key features: 
•  Open enrolment: parents were given the right to choose the school they 
wanted their child to go to, though parents generally have to choose a school 
within the LEA in which they live.  
•  Overlapping catchment areas around schools, where catchment areas 
were based on geographical distance from the school. 
•  Both funding and management of schools was devolved to a more 
local level. 
•  Schools were funded on the basis of the number of pupils enrolled. 
•  Funding remained provided by central government, funded out of 
central government taxation. 
These features remain to the present date. The intention was that per capita 
funding and parental choice would bring about competition between schools for 
                                                 
3 Prior to 1988, LEAs – a tier of regional government in the UK – had considerable autonomy to 
allocate central government funding to schools and to decide educational policy in their area. A few 
LEAs retained a system of schools in which children were allocated on the basis on ability: to 
‘grammar’ schools (for the more able) and secondary modern or comprehensive schools (for the less 
able), but most ran a system of non-selective schools. LEAs still exist, with considerably less 
autonomy. There are currently 150 LEAs, containing on average 119 primary schools (children aged 5-
11) and 21 secondary schools (children aged 11-18). 8 
pupils, which would raise educational outcomes (Glennerster 1991)
4. In fact, 
residence does still matter in gaining admission to over-subscribed schools, although 
the importance of residence as an admissions criterion differs both across jurisdictions 
and across different school types. The system is inflexible in that the size of schools 
cannot be quickly increased or reduced.  
Parental choice of school in this market is informed by two types of formal 
performance measure, and more informally through friends and general reputation. 
The first type are reports made on each school by a government agency (Ofsted) that 
makes in-depth site visits to each school at least once every six years. The second type 
of performance measure are the summary statistics on each school’s performance, 
published annually in what are known as the school ‘league tables’. These report a 
range of test score outcomes for the schools.  
The structure of the market gives incentives for schools to attract more able 
pupils. Whilst the simple financial gain from attracting more able pupils is no 
different to that from attracting less able pupils
5, there are indirect gains. First, if peer 
group effects are important, schools with a high proportion of able children will 
achieve higher outcomes. Second, career concerns of head teachers mean that they 
may want to be associated with ‘successful’ schools. Third, more able children may 





For this analysis we use the Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC) 
dataset, a key administrative dataset which forms part of the National Pupil Database 
                                                 
4 The quasi-market system differs from Tiebout choice in that it is not a system of local taxation and so 
not one of local determination of school funding or quality. Funding is raised by central government 
taxation and allocated to LEAs on the basis of pupil numbers. 
5 There is some additional funding for children identified as having special educational needs. 9 
(NPD). PLASC covers all pupils in both primary and secondary schools in England, 
with approximately half a million pupils in each cohort. At pupil level, it provides 
complete linked histories of test scores plus some individual characteristics: gender 
and within-year age, ethnicity, eligibility for free school meals (FSM) (an indicator of 
low household income)
6 and special educational needs. Finally, and crucially for our 
analysis, we have the home postcode of every pupil in the dataset, enabling us to 
locate each pupil in relation to schools (and also to a range of administrative 
geographies). Pupils are linked to schools. At school level, there are a wide range of 
characteristics, including performance measures, geographical co-ordinates, school 
size, age range, religious denomination, funding status, gender mix and admissions 
policy. 
Pupils take Key Stage 2 (KS2) tests at age 11 at the end of their primary 
school education. These are important tests for the schools as they are reported in the 
school ‘league tables’ discussed above. The pupils then move on to secondary schools 
to complete their education. We analyse the sorting of pupils into secondary schools 
on the basis of their KS2 scores.  
In this analysis we (mostly) analyse state secondary schools in England, which 
pupils attend between the ages of 11 and 16 or 18, and omit private (fee-paying) 
schools. The main reason for this is that these schools are not required to take the Key 
Stage exams, and so only some report these data. In fact, for only around half of our 
cohort in private schools we have KS2 data. It seems unlikely that this will be a 
random sample of private schools, so the clearest strategy is to leave them all out.  
Also, it is not a big quantitative issue: around 7% of pupils in our cohort attend 
private schools. Nevertheless, these schools are of interest, and may be an important 
                                                 
6 Eligibility for FSMs is essentially a measure of whether the family is entitled to social security 
benefits. 10 
margin for choice in some places. We therefore present some evidence relating to 
them. We also omit special schools and other academic centres such as hospital 
schools and detention centres from our dataset. 
One of the focuses of the paper is the two different pupil assignment rules 
used. A few Local Education Authorities (LEAs) have retained a system in which 
children are explicitly allocated to schools on the basis of test scores: to grammar 
schools (for the more able) and secondary moderns (for the less able); this is what we 
call the elite schooling assignment mechanism. In these LEAs, therefore, location is 
not a key part of the assignment mechanism. The majority of LEAs run a system in 
which pupils of all abilities attend what are known as comprehensive schools, and 
distance from the school is an important admission criterion; this is neighbourhood 
schooling. Given that overt selection by ability will have an impact on the sorting of 
pupils of different types across schools, part of our analysis focuses just on non-
selective LEAs. We define a selective LEA as one in which more than 10% of pupils 
attend a grammar school. 
We use the co-ordinates for each school to construct our measure of choice. 
Overlaying school locations with a complete road network, we construct drive-time 
zones (DTZs) around schools. In this paper we choose a 10-minute DTZ around every 
secondary school in England and count the number of schools within this area: this 
number of ‘nearby’ schools is our measure of the extent of choice in a local market. In 
future work, we will utilize the full variation at school level, but in this paper we 
aggregate this to LEA level for comparison with our measures of sorting and 
segregation. 
We characterize student sorting across three different dimensions: ability, 
ethnicity and disadvantage. Segregation is a characteristic of an aggregate of units, 11 
and we take the LEA as the aggregate, measuring segregation across both schools and 
electoral wards (neighbourhoods) within an LEA
7. We take the neighbourhood basis 
for segregation as approximating where people want to live and compare that with the 
outcome of their school choice conditional on where they live. In US terms, these are 
like inter- and intra-district choice respectively.  
We use the dissimilarity index, D, as our measure of segregation. This is the 
most widely used segregation index, following the foundational work of Duncan and 
Duncan (1955). Massey and Denton (1988) provide an extensive discussion and 
evaluation of different measures of segregation. The dissimilarity index is based on 
the idea of segregation as unevenness of the distribution of different types of students 
across units within the aggregate area. The more uneven the spread, the higher the 
degree of segregation. D ranges from 0 to 1, and can be interpreted as the fraction of 
students in the aggregate area that would need to move in order for there to be an even 
distribution of groups across units (schools or wards) in the area. Cutler, Glaeser and 
Vidgor (1999) quote Massey and Denton (1993) suggesting that values of 0 – 0.3 are 





a)  Feasibility and Exercise of Choice 
 
We first establish that choice between different schools is feasible for most 
students in England. Choice can be exercised in two ways: in the dual choice of 
residential location and school, and in the choice of school given residence. The 
former will depend on the nature and location of jobs (among other things). Here we 
take the labour and housing markets as given and focus on the second. We ask the 
                                                 
7 We have replicated some of this analysis at DTZ level. Results available from the authors. 12 
question, do parents (or children) have a choice of school and do schools have 
potential children to choose between? 
Using the ten minute drive-time zone (DTZ), Table 1 shows the distribution of 
the number of nearby schools for the whole country and split by area type, London, 
non-London Urban, and Rural areas. The results show that, on average, secondary 
schools in England have more than 6 schools within ten minutes drive of themselves. 
The modal category is between 1 and 5 schools and 14% have no close alternatives. 
The pattern across the three area types is as expected: in the densest area, London, the 
mean is 17, falling to 7 in non-London urban, and just over 1 in rural areas. Note that 
nearly half of schools in rural areas have no alternatives within ten minutes
8.  
Of course, the feasibility of choice does not mean that it is taken up. We can 
use the geographic information in the dataset to address this directly. For each 
student, we determine the nearest school to their home address
9, and thus define 
whether they attend their nearest school.  We present the mean proportion attending 
their nearest school and by different sub-areas. Table 2 shows that overall some 45% 
of children attend their nearest school. Thus just over half are “exercising choice” in 
the sense of not going to the closest school, given their place of residence. To be 
clear, an individual may be forced to go to a far-away school by the choices of others 
filling up her local school. In the context of a semi-closed and relatively inflexible 
system, not being at the nearest school may not be voluntary. The general equilibrium 
                                                 
8 The use of a single time may underestimate the amount of choice in rural areas. Longer drive times 
for everything are the norm in rural areas, and the utility equivalent of a ten minute drive time in an 
urban area may be a longer distance in rural areas. 
9 This is using straight-line distances. We convert the postcode information to latitude and longitude, 
and then simply use Pythagoras’s theorem to determine distances to each school. For three subsets we 
have checked this against road distances and found a correspondence of 85% in the two methods’ 
designation of nearest school. We are pursuing this analysis in more depth in a companion paper to 
this. 13 
implications of choice are complex in such an environment, and it is not possible to 
work back from the observed outcome to “who exercised choice”. 
That less than half of secondary school pupils in England attend their nearest 
school is a striking finding, however, and suggests that post-residential school choice 
is a very important component of the overall schooling decision. Again, the 
breakdown by area types is as expected: the proportion attending the nearest school is 
lowest in denser environments. Splitting the sample into selective and non-selective 
LEAs, in the latter more pupils go to their closest school. Since location is not a key 
part of the student assignment mechanism in selective LEAs this is not surprising.  
 
b)  Characterisation of Ability Sorting 
 
Ability sorting is key to the nature and impact of peer group effects and hence 
to one of the main issues in the analysis of choice. We therefore focus on this in 
detail, and discuss other dimensions of segregation later. This is also facilitated by the 
fact that we can consider the whole ability distribution. 






th percentiles of the KS2 distribution in each school in 
an LEA. These are then graphed out, connecting the quantiles. Consider the top left 
panel of Figure 1, for Islington, a small LEA in London. Each vertical slice through 
the graph shows the distribution of KS2 scores for a school. All the schools in the 
LEA are portrayed, the schools ranked by mean KS2. Because the KS2 scores can 
take only a small number of values, the lines contain long flat segments. Using KS4 
scores with much more variation produces the same patterns but with a greater degree 
of continuity.  
The patterns are interpreted as follows. A flat set of quantile lines (as in 
Islington) shows very little ability sorting, as all schools have more or less the same 14 
intake ability distribution. By contrast, a set of upward sloping lines indicates a high 
level of intake stratification, and the more steeply sloping the lines the greater the 
degree of stratification. An advantage of this graphical approach is that it allows the 
whole distribution to be considered, and differential sorting at the top or bottom of the 
intake ability distribution to be revealed. 
Figure 1 presents the quantile graphs for a selection of LEAs, chosen on the 
basis of degree of location/urbanisation, and selection policy
10. As noted, there 
appears to be very little ability sorting in Islington, a small (in terms of area) London 
LEA with no overt selection policy. In Islington, the highest (mean) intake (KS2 
score) school has essentially the same ability distribution as the lowest. This is not 
just a feature of London. The final panel of Figure 1 is for Oxfordshire (which also is 
not selective). Here there is a little more stratification, but still the highest intake and 
the lowest intake school are not that different in terms of the ability distribution within 
the school. The situation in Barnet, a London LEA with some selective schools, is 
different. Whilst the bulk of schools in the middle are similar, there is a group at the 
top and a group at the bottom with very different intakes. In the top (highest mean 
intake) three schools, the 10
th percentile of their ability is commensurate with the 90
th 
percentile of bottom schools. The top two schools receive no or few students below 
29 KS2 points, while the lowest four schools take very few above that score. Barnet 
has a small number of selective schools and their impact on the pattern is clear.  
The patterns in the two very large metro areas of Birmingham and Manchester 
are rather different. Both exhibit gently upward sloping lines, but in the case of 
Manchester, these are generally smooth, showing a relatively continuous pattern of 
stratification. In Birmingham it is clear that there is a set of elite “academies” with 
                                                 
10 The graphs for all LEAs are available from the authors. 15 
very little intake of students below 25 points. These are Birmingham’s selective 
schools. Manchester has no selective schools. The figures for Trafford, 
Buckinghamshire and Kent, which largely conform to the elite assignment rule, show 
very strongly the impact of selective schools. There is a clear dichotomisation of the 
distribution in each of these LEAs. It is interesting that the difference in the 
distributions is much greater at the bottom of the ability distribution than at the top. 
The high intake schools do have more high ability students, but the main distinction is 
that they take in no low ability students.  
We can characterise the relationship between the degree of ability sorting and 
the feasibility of choice. We derive a summary statistic of the degree of sorting by 
regressing each pupil’s KS2 score on the school mean KS2.  We take the R
2 as the 
measure of sorting
11. Very low sorting means that an individual pupil’s score is 
uncorrelated with the school mean, implying a low R
2. High sorting implies high 
correlation of individual and school score and so a high R
2. We run this regression 
separately for each LEA to produce an LEA-level measure of sorting. Table 3 simply 
regresses this R
2 measure against the average number of schools that are reachable 
from a school in the LEA in a ten-minute drive, averaged over the LEA. The results 
are mildly supportive of a positive relationship in non-selective LEAs: more schools 
within a DTZ mean more sorting by ability. We return to this issue below. 
We return briefly to the role of private schools. As noted above, we do not 
have data for all private schools. Figure 2 shows a modified version of the quantile 
graphs for 4 LEAs, including the data on the private schools we have data for. These 
are denoted by a vertical line joining the quantiles. The other addition to the figure is 
                                                 
11 This is very closely related to the within/between variance ratio. While there may be statistical issues 
arising from the use of the R
2 from one regression as the dependent variable in another, we are simply 
using it here as an intuitive summary statistic. In fact, it correlates well with the standard D measure of 
segregation, which could be used instead.  16 
an upper panel showing the size of the school (strictly, the size of our cohort in the 
school). The figure shows that private schools are typically at the top end of the intake 
distribution (eg Oxfordshire), but not always (eg Barnet). It shows that in all these 
LEAs, they are much smaller than state schools
12. The inclusion of these schools 
changes the picture considerably for Oxfordshire (now looking much more 
segregated) and Manchester. The impact is less marked on Barnet and Birmingham. 
Overall, comparing the R
2 sorting statistic with and without the (partial) data on 
private schools shows that for most LEAs they are similar, with increased sorting in 
some (not least because numbers in these schools are so low). The rest of the paper 
reverts to exclusion of all private schools. 
 
c)  Characterisation of Multi-dimensional Sorting 
 
We now consider different dimensions of student sorting. In particular, we are 
interested in how these are related. We measure segregation on dimensions of student  
disadvantage (entitlement to free school meals, FSM), of ethnic group, and of ability. 
To allow us to straightforwardly compare these, we create two dichotomous measures 
of ability: high ability (a student having a KS2 score above the 80
th percentile), and 
low ability (a KS2 score below the 20
th percentile). National level indices of 
segregation make little sense in this context, so we calculate the indices for each LEA 
separately, and then look at the distribution across LEAs, weighting by the LEA 
student population. Each measure is calculated for each LEA and the distribution 
refers to the distribution over LEAs, so the 75
th percentile is to be interpreted as 
giving the value of the dissimilarity index, D, above which 25% of LEAs are to be 
found. Table 4 shows the means and some details of the distribution of the 
segregation measures. 
                                                 
12 This is not an artefact of our partial data. We have all the data for each school, but not all schools. 17 
The levels of ability and poverty segregation are generally not high. Three 
quarters of LEAs have ability and poverty segregation measures of 0.32 or below. 
Even at the extremes, segregation is not very high. The situation is very different for 
ethnic segregation, with high average values and very high values in some LEAs (see 
Burgess and Wilson (2003) for a more detailed analysis of ethnic segregation in 
England’s schools).  
Table 5 shows the summary correlation across LEAs of segregation on these 
different dimensions. Unsurprisingly, areas with relatively high segregation of low 
ability pupils also tend to have high segregation of high ability pupils. Given the link 
between low KS2 scores and family poverty (FSM), the correlation of segregation on 
these two dimensions is also as expected. The simple unconditional correlations 
between ethnic segregation and ability segregation are negative. This may be related 
to the fact that the populations of Black and South Asian ethnic origin groups are 
spread very unevenly across the country (Burgess and Wilson 2003).  
 
d)  Post-residential Choice and Sorting 
 
One of the powerful aspects of our dataset is the ability to place students in 
their neighbourhood context. We can use the postcode data to assign each student to a 
ward (an electoral unit of around 5000 people on average, including approximately 
600 10-17 year olds) within an LEA. This means that we can compare the spatial 
patterns of students in two different but related domains, their home and their school.  
Having located students in wards, we can analyse the distribution of ability (and other 
characteristics) across space. As far as we know, this is only possible using our 
dataset, and has not been examined before. This allows us to compute measures of 
sorting of students in the neighbourhoods where they (choose to) live as well as the 18 
schools they choose to attend. This means we can document the relationship of spatial 
patterns of residence under different student-school matching rules.  
Figure 3 graphs the school-based segregation measure (vertical axis) against 
the neighbourhood-based measure (horizontal axis). This gives us a picture of the 
impact of post-residential choice on the degree of sorting. These are for non-selective 
LEAs only. The first two panels examine high and low ability segregation, and the 
third income (FSM) segregation
13. Focussing on the ability segregation results, it is 
striking that there is not a very close relationship between segregation in schools and 
segregation in neighbourhoods. The 45
o line shows that these non-selective LEAs 
split about evenly into those in which the student-school matching increases the 
segregation of high ability students, and those in which it attenuates it. There are, 
however, some LEAs where the school-based segregation is considerably higher than 
segregation at the neighbourhood level. We take this as evidence of post-residential 
segregation. The same pattern is observed for low ability student segregation and for 
income (FSM) segregation. 
In Figure 4 we consider explicitly the impact of ability selection in the 
selective LEAs. The first panel shows all LEAs, the second panel selective and the 
third panel non-selective LEAs. As expected, it is clear that the selective LEAs 
exhibit very high levels of high-ability segregation in schools. But it is also clear that 
they do not, in general, have very high levels of neighbourhood segregation of ability. 
This illustrates the divorce of residence choice from school choice that arises in elite 
schooling areas.  
In Figure 5 we explicitly compare the quantile graphs based on school and on 
neighbourhood. The top panels show Buckinghamshire (an elite schooling LEA) and 
                                                 
13 Ethnic segregation is discussed in more detail in Burgess, Wilson and Lupton (2004). 19 
the bottom panels Hertfordshire (the latter being a neighbourhood schooling LEA 
matched to the former using PS matching techniques; details available from the 
authors). There are a number of points to make. First, as noted before, the contrast in 
the schools’ pattern between the two areas is very stark. Second, in Buckinghamshire, 
we do not see the same sorting pattern for neighbourhoods that we do for schools. 
This illustrates the divergence of school and neighbourhood sorting with an elite 
school assignment rule. Finally, we might expect to see greater residential sorting in 
the neighbourhood assignment rule LEA, but that is not obvious in this particular 
conparison. 
This leads on to an analysis of the degree of choice and the concentration or 
dilution of residential segregation by the school matching process. It is clear, not least 
from the graphs above, that one cannot take residence as exogenous and think about 
school choice conditional on that. Choice of residence depends on the nature of the 
pupil assignment rule, with school and residence choice determined jointly. But it is 
also clear from our results above that post-residence school choice is a substantial part 
of the overall school choice process. It is worthwhile characterising the (partial 
equilibrium) nature of this process whilst being aware that the degree of school and 
neighbourhood segregation may be a factor in initial housing choice.  
We take the ratio of the school-based segregation index to the neighbourhood-
based segregation index as an indicator of this process. In Table 6 we regress this on 
our measure of school choice, the average number of schools that are reachable in a 
ten-minute drive from a school in the LEA, averaged over the LEA. We repeat this for 
all the dimensions of segregation considered, and separately for all LEAs and just 
non-selective (neighbourhood schooling) LEAs. We find a strong positive correlation 
between the extent of choice and the extent of school segregation, controlling for 20 
residential segregation. We find this for all dimensions of segregation. The correlation 
is statistically significant in all the analyses and stronger among non-selective LEAs. 
In other words, in areas in which there are a bigger number of schools to choose 
between, school segregation is high relative to neighbourhood segregation. 
Quantitatively the effect is significant as well: a one standard deviation difference in 
the choice measure of 6.7 schools adds 0.13 to the high ability segregation measure, 
0.17 to low ability segregation, and 0.23 to poverty segregation, relative to standard 
deviations of 0.175, 0.18 and 0.20 respectively. This can be described in two ways – 
greater choice means that parents can select their desired peer group more easily, 
conditional on where they live. Or, easier choice means that, given the desired school, 
parents have greater scope for living where they choose, and not necessarily right next 





This paper has exploited a large administrative data set for England to 
examine the effects of choice on sorting of pupils across schools for 11-18 year olds. 
England has a system of generalised but differential choice. Parents have some choice 
of school, but this choice is constrained by availability of schools and education 
policy. So the observed outcome results from the interaction of demand and supply 
side selection, feasibility of choice and the assignment rule which governs the 
allocation of children to school (the last being selection on ability versus selection 
based on distance).  
We first establish that choice of secondary school is both feasible for and 
exercised by the majority of pupils in England. Over half of pupils aged 11 do not go 
to their nearest secondary school. We characterise ability sorting and show that ability 21 
sorting at school level is also correlated with sorting at school level by income and 
ethnicity.  We then examine whether the feasibility of choice affects ability sorting 
and find a positive relationship. Sorting is greater where there is more choice: or put 
another way, markets in which there are more schools are markets in which there is 
more ability sorting.  
School sorting might simply reflect neighbourhood sorting. We find there is 
ability sorting (as well as income and ethnicity sorting) by neighbourhood, but on 
average ability sorting at neighbourhood level is less than school sorting. Controlling 
for neighbourhood sorting i.e. focusing on post-residential choice, we find that 
differences in the school-neighbourhood sorting relationship are correlated with the 
assignment rule that allocates children to schools. The relationship between 
neighbourhood and school sorting is weaker where LEAs explicitly assign pupils to 
schools on the basis of ability, so allocation based on distance appears to bring about 
greater homogeneity of local neighbourhood. Finally, we bring these analyses 
together and examine the extent to which sorting by ability at LEA level is correlated 
with feasibility of choice, the assignment rule and income. We find statistical support 
for a role played by all these factors.  
These data hold great promise in unravelling some of the complex patterns 
involved in creating peer groups in schools, and in particular the roles of the degree of 
school choice and the nature of the pupil assignment rule. 22 
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Table 1 – Number of nearby schools 
 
   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 0 1-5  6-10  11+  Observations 
All 6.69  6.74  14.52  40.96  23.22  21.3  3127 
                      
London 17.19  7.39  0.48  3.14  13.29  83.09 414 
Non London Urban  6.74  5.04  3.63  45.7  33.48  17.19 1873 
Non London Rural  1.41  1.85  45.71  49.05  5.24  0  840 












All 44.59  524,609 
       
London 24.09  66,348 
Non London Urban  43.43  319,128 
Non London Rural  57.01  139,133 
       
Non Selective LEAs   46.66  458,522 





Table 3 – Ability sorting and the feasibility of choice 
Dependent Variable: R




(1) (2) (3) 




No. nearby schools   0.001  0.001  0.001 
(LEA average) 
 
(0.93) (2.17)* (0.14) 
Constant  0.127 0.090 0.355 
 (9.18)**  (12.26)**  (8.28)** 
Observations 144  125  19 
R-squared  0.01 0.04 0.00 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 







Table 4 – Segregation indices 
 
    
Basis  of  Segregation  Mean  p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
High  ability  0.293 0.175 0.205 0.253 0.321 0.469 
Low  ability  0.252  0.18  0.205 0.245 0.283 0.336 
Disadvantage  0.29  0.2  0.246 0.293 0.327 0.369 
        
Ethnic Group        
Black  Caribbean  0.623 0.233 0.419 0.684 0.883 0.936 
Black  African  0.683 0.277 0.548 0.772 0.887 0.933 
Black,  other  0.654 0.344 0.532 0.689 0.847 0.916 
Indian  0.585 0.345 0.462 0.601 0.726 0.831 
Pakistani  0.684 0.426 0.582  0.72  0.837 0.917 
Bangladeshi  0.707 0.427 0.615 0.748 0.861 0.932 
Chinese  0.624 0.418 0.546 0.637 0.733 0.788 
Other  0.504 0.323 0.386 0.503 0.625 0.707 
        
Black  0.534 0.273 0.394 0.526 0.668 0.806 






Table 5 – Correlation of segregation indices 
 
   Black 
South 
Asian  Low ability High ability Disadvantage
Black 1          
South Asian  0.374  1        
Low ability  -0.145  -0.06  1      
High ability  -0.142  -0.1  0.791  1    
















Table 6 – Relationship between school/neighbourhood ratio and school 
choice 
Dependent variable: Ratio of school-based to neighbourhood-based segregation 
measure of the indicated variable: 
 
All  LEAs  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 








No. nearby schools   0.020  0.026  0.034  0.024  0.020 
(LEA average) 
 
(2.14)* (4.59)**  (9.58)**  (7.13)**  (7.11)** 
Constant 1.155  0.962  0.743  0.725  0.768 
 (12.01)**  (16.30)**  (19.82)**  (20.24)**  (26.25)** 
Observations 144  144  144  142  143 




        
No. nearby schools   0.021  0.027  0.036  0.025  0.019 
(LEA average) 
 
(5.27)** (6.20)**  (10.08)**  (7.15)**  (7.02)** 
Constant 0.905  0.864  0.710  0.720  0.761 
 (20.62)**  (18.17)**  (18.64)**  (19.19)**  (26.51)** 
Observations 125  125  125  123  124 
R-squared 0.18  0.24  0.45  0.30  0.29 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 


























0 2  4  6 8 10










0 5 10 15 20












0 20  40 60 80










0 5 10 15 20 25














0 5  10 15 20










0 10  20 30 40












0 20  40  60 80 100










0 10  20 30 40




Oxfordshire - KS2 
 29 
Figure 2: Ability Sorting including Private Schools 
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 Figure 5: School and Neighbourhood Sorting – Elite and Neighbourhood Schooling 
Buckinghamshire is an Elite (Selective) Schooling LEA, Hertfordshire an otherwise-similar neighbourhood (non-selective) LEA 
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